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During the 3 0 th Anniversary Dinner of the Clinical Law
Program last April, Steve Wizner and Jane Aiken continued a
conversation that has taken place in the academic community nearly
since the inception of clinical teaching. At the risk of
oversimplification, Wizner advocates making all aspects of clinical
legal education secondary to the immersion of students in the delivery
of legal services to clients.' The theory that clinical education should
focus less on teaching and more on doing is one that has found great
traction in the community of clinical educators.2 Aiken, on the other
hand, posits that time and space for reflection must be provided in law
school clinics if the experiential learning that takes place is to be truly
effective. 3 By simply throwing students in, she suggests, we risk them
feeling helpless.4 This position, too, has found a healthy chorus of
supporters. As a relative newcomer to the field of clinical teaching, I
struggle daily to find the appropriate balance between the poles. And,
while I have not yet chosen a side in the debate, the idea that clinical
education should be primarily an avenue for providing legal services to
underserved communities raises for me troubling implications beyond
the mere helplessness of students. In a world where most law school
clinics maintain a clientele in the lower income brackets,5 I question
whether emphasizing "doing" over "teaching" undercuts the
overarching goal of providing skilled legal representation to
underserved communities.
I broach this difficult question with two stories, the first about
practice and the second about teaching. When I first entered the
practice of law, I went to work for a non-profit legal services office
that provided appellate representation to indigent criminal defendants.
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I found the work invigorating, intellectually challenging, rich and
textured. The structure of the office confirmed my notion that this was
work of not just practical import, but intellectual value. Our caseloads
were kept at a manageable level, giving us the time and space to reflect
on broader questions of the interplay between class and race andjustice. Every case was actively supervised by a senior attorney.
Potential legal issues were researched and discussed at length before
ever being incorporated into a pleading, and the varied implications of
potential law reform questions were carefully considered before being
presented to the highest court. Cases were heavily mooted prior to
oral argument, and even the most senior attorneys in the office
regularly vetted ideas and legal analyses. At lunch we sat together in
the office's kitchen and discussed our cases, the trends in the courts,
and the legal issues of the day. I believed at the time, and still firmly
believe now, that as lawyers we were there not because we had
nowhere else to go, but because it was the best place we could be.
When I left the office, I decided to join the state's indigent
appellate defense panel. The nominal amount of money paid was
hardly motivation to do the work. Rather, it was my desire to maintain
a connection to the rich intellectual community of appellate practice
that prompted my application. During my initial interview for
admission, however, my interviewer repeatedly pressed me about why
I wanted to do work she characterized as beneath me. "Your
credentials indicate that you're smarter than this," she whispered
conspiratorially. It was a blatant decoupling of intellectual rigor and
legal service to the poor, one that I often heard repeated in the years to
come.
When I entered the academy, I naively assumed that students
would understand intuitively that close attention to intellectual pursuits
is part and parcel of quality legal representation-no matter what the
financial circumstances of your client. I thought back to my own years
as a law student, and assumed that my students too would have an
innocent belief in principles of fairness and equality; a belief that the
law is a social equalizer that can, and should, be used to promote
justice; a belief that work for or on behalf of the poor may be different
in kind, but not in degree, from other types of practice. I was wrong.
In the fall of my second year of teaching, I sat with my students
discussing their employment goals following graduation. Most were
planning to join corporate law firms. Knowing that they faced six-
figure debt upon graduation, I was not surprised by their career
choices. I assumed they were nothing more than cold calculations of
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dollars and cents. What I heard from the students though was
something more unfortunate. Almost to a person, the response was
that as long as you were dedicated, anyone could do the work of a non-
profit, indeed most of them had-as students for clinical credit. But,
now it was time to become serious about their careers. It was time to
pursue something more challenging. I believe that if we value what
we do, clinical faculty must actively combat this attitude--one that
divorces intellectual acumen from the provision of legal services to the
poor.
Without, at this point, making any further judgment, I offer the
observation that the academy places a high premium on analytic
intelligence. 6 Prior to the 1970s, law school training focused almost
exclusively upon case analysis and the development of legal theory.
After the advent of clinical programs, "stand-up" faculty continued to
enjoy a perceived position of primacy in the academic pecking order.
Even today, the narrow range of intelligence embraced in large-section
classes echoes and reinforces the notion that analysis of the law
requires skill, care and practice. To the extent that students don't
come to law school already embracing that bias, they are quickly
indoctrinated. Logical and analytical intelligence is identified early on
as the most valuable asset a law student can possess. Law reviews and
journals, and the near constant emphasis on high grades in traditional
courses all reinforce the message that the academic exercise of
learning about the law is a superior pursuit.
In contrast, a significant percentage of the skills needed for
successful lawyering are sidelined and devalued. The abilities to
interview, to counsel, or to persuade, among others, are characterized
as "innate," and thus undeserving of rigorous study. The actual
practice of law is trivialized as something new graduates will simply
intuit. Clinicians must acknowledge this dichotomy and have a
strategic appreciation for the value that the academy places upon
intellectual pursuits. Any pedagogical approach to clinical education
that endorses "doing," at the expense of "teaching," reaffirms the
notion that the actual practice of law is distinct and, therefore, less
valuable. This observation is troubling not because of what it means
to the full acceptance of clinical faculty into the academy, but because
of the ramifications it has upon the provision of legal services to the
poor.
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First, with regard to poor folks, the notion that the logical
ability valued in law schools is unnecessary to legal representation is
not balanced by the same competing messages students receive
regarding the representation of wealthier clients. Competitive hiring
practices that mimic law school measures of success, six-figure
starting salaries, and a begrudging societal respect for "shrewd" big
firm attorneys all act to offset the messages that law students receive
about law practice as it relates to paying clients. No similar
counterbalance is available for legal services-type representation.
Second, even assuming students of exceptional diligence, the
necessary limitations of the human condition will require students to
prioritize their course work. Thus, to the extent that students working
in clinical programs operate within the current system of law school
values, the representation clients receive will, in large measure, be
sub-optimal. No amount of talented supervision can correct for this.
Third, to the extent that student assumptions regarding the
absence of a link between analytical ability and the representation of
the poor are not challenged by academically rigorous clinical
programs, it is unlikely that students will choose to engage in the work
in the long term. As my students told me, when it comes time to "get
serious" about careers, students will turn to pursuits that are deemed
valuable not only by their peers, but by the legal community at large.
Finally, when clinical teaching abandons efforts to be
academically rigorous about the lessons it is teaching, it does not even
provide students with skills that can be readily transferred to other
7areas of practice. As some academic theorists have noted, an
exclusively "case-centered" approach to clinical teaching does not
successfully promote the transfer of lawyering skills.8
In closing, therefore, I end where I began, with the question of
whether focusing clinical education exclusively on "doing" leaves
students with the unspoken, and no doubt unintended, message that
poor and underserved communities can be represented intuitively, and
thereby undermines the very goals it seeks to achieve. I haven't yet
arrived at an answer to that question with which I'm fully comfortable.
For the moment though, if my above musing withstands scrutiny, I
can't help but believe that in the long run, "doing" at the expense of
"teaching" is a focus we can not afford to embrace.
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